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Introduction
The 21 st century epitomizes the era of globalization, witnessing massive exchanges of economic activities, human movements, and information flows across borders. Accordingly, globalization affects different dimensions of life, including women's standing and welfare.
This paper investigates whether globalization could be a driving force in improving women's rights and if so, which type of globalization can be beneficial to women.
In an attempt to empirically investigate this question, much of the literature focuses on the effects of economic integration on women's economic activities. These studies look into the impact of globalization on women from the perspective of traditional trade theory, comparative advantage and competition, thus analyzing whether economic integration could create more employment opportunities for women and increase their wages.
This focus on economic integration and women's employment raises the question of how certain types of economic reform affect particular forms of women's rights and welfare.
It is not surprising to observe very different outcomes across countries, depending on their economic and industrial structures. In other words, this approach focusing on economic globalization and female employment can provide the answer to the question of whether certain economic reforms could create an economic structure favorable to labor activities typically provided by women, and in addition, if such increases in demand could push up the price of female labor. However, it does not answer an arguably more fundamental question, that being whether globalization can eventually reduce the causes of gender discrimination, improve women's fundamental rights and generally empower women.
To address this issue, one should look beyond the impact of globalization on women's economic activities -wages and employment -and examine whether globalization can enhance 'women's status' or 'women's rights', which allow women better access to resources and ensure their standing in legal and social institutions without discrimination (Morrisson and Jütting 2005) . Surprisingly, most of the present literature has neglected the difference between women's rights and the subsequent outcomes, merely investigating the impact of globalization on certain economic activities of women. To the best of my knowledge, there are only a few existing studies empirically addressing the causal relation between women's fundamental rights and globalization. Among them, de Soysa (2007, 2011) and Richards and Gelleny (2007) show that economic globalization positively affects women's rights. However, these studies limit globalization to economic integration, which tends to be more closely associated to the outcomes of women's economic activities rather than the fundamental rights of women, and do not take into account the impact of another important dimension of globalization, social globalization. Social globalization -defined as information flows, personal contacts, and cultural sharing across countries (Dreher 2006 ) -can arguably be a more important determinant of women's rights because it can promote the spread of ideas, norms and civil actions worldwide by facilitating contact and communication across people in different countries (Rosenau 2003) .
In this respect, Gray et al. (2006) 's study is worthwhile noting here. Their study focuses on the diffusion of women's rights through international interconnectedness.
International interconnectedness includes not only trade openness and FDI but also However, their study investigates the impact of economic and social globalization separately, not taking into account that there might be overlapping effects between the two. In other words, it could be possible that the positive effects of economic globalization have been detected because of the underlying effects of social globalization which accompany them 2 . In fact, despite positive correlation, economic and social globalization represents different dimensions of international exchanges, with potentially very different goals. While economic globalization mainly reflects the flows of goods and services for the interests of capital, social globalization connects people and enables them to exchange ideas and information, furthermore pursuing solidarity in shared causes (e.g. human rights and gender equality).
1 Sweeney (2006 Sweeney ( , 2007 also investigates the effects of CEDAW and democracy on the spread of women's rights attainment -in particular economic rights. 2 Additionally, their study is limited to cross-sectional data in developing countries, not capturing variations in women's rights over time worldwide.
Building on the current literature, my paper investigates the potential effects of social globalization on women's rights. As said earlier, people living in countries with a high level of social globalization are more likely to express and respect opinions different from tradition and conventional thinking, as well as demonstrating increased cohesion in shared causes for change (Rosenau 2003) . In this respect, social globalization could lead to societal tolerance and acceptance for progress in women's rights and their alternative roles. The result of the test presented in appendix 1 empirically backs up Rosenau's argument. The empirical finding
shows that social globalization enhances the level of civil liberty -defined as the freedom of expression and civil association -enabling social reform which can be transmitted into the betterment of women's rights 3 . Such positive effects of social globalization would affect overall human rights practices, however, the impact can arguably be stronger for women. This is because women would not lose but rather benefit through changes challenging the established male-dominated societal structures social globalization may bring.
My investigation makes the following contributions to the literature. First, this paper addresses and empirically investigates the importance of social globalization on women's rights and singles out the effects of social globalization separately from those of economic globalization. Second, my analysis includes not only rights of female citizens in a country, but is extended to examine whether the impact of social globalization, if any, can also reach foreign women illegally living in other countries whose rights are presumably marginalized in the legal system. Here, human trafficking is proxied as an indicator of how a country tolerates abuse and exploitation of these women. This proxy is suitable as human trafficking is a form of extreme exploitation, usually for sexual and labor purposes, and the vast majority of victims are foreign women (UNODC 2006) . This paper argues that if globalization can promote respect for women's rights, making them norms across countries, then such an improvement should benefit not only local women, but also foreign women living in another country. Addressing human trafficking in relation to the impact of globalization on women's rights is a new approach and, to the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first study dealing with this issue.
Through a cross-country analysis of 150 countries during the 1981-2008 period, I find that: 1) social globalization increases women's rights; 2) the impact of economic globalization disappears when controlling for social globalization; and 3) despite the positive linkage between globalization and women's rights, globalization does not have any positive effect on foreign women's rights, proxied with human trafficking.
This paper continues as follows. Section 2 presents the main hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data on women's rights and globalization, as well as human trafficking. Section 4 discusses the estimation strategy including endogeneity concerns, followed by the empirical findings in section 5 and tests for robustness in section 6. In section 7, this paper concludes with policy implications.
Hypotheses

Economic Globalization and Women's Rights
A considerable amount of literature has contributed to the question whether economic globalization improves women's economic rights in the form of employment and wages.
Proponents of globalization argue that trade and FDI positively affect women's employment opportunities in developing countries, due to their comparative advantages. In other words, developing countries have a comparative advantage in labor-intensive goods, thus demand for female labor would increase in order to keep price competitiveness in international trade as female wages are generally lower. Indeed, many empirical studies find a positive association between export-oriented manufacturing and women's increased share in paid employment (Chow 2003; Fontana and Wood 2000) .
However, an increase in female labor force participation does not always lead to economic empowerment as long as such demand for female labor is based on women's acceptance of poor payment and exploitative working conditions. Although StolperSamuelson-type trade theory predicts that an increase in demand for female labor will eventually lead to higher female wages and better working conditions, empirical evidence does not necessarily support this theoretical prediction as long as there is an abundance of unemployed workers available in those developing countries. The literature clearly suggests contradicting results. On the one hand, globalization may benefit women in general by reducing gender differences in employment and wages if accompanied with subsequent economic growth due to the relatively flexible accommodation of females into the labor forces of integrated economies (Tzannatos 1999) . On the other hand, export-led growth, based on ever-growing competition and price cuts, may increase the divide between the winners and losers of globalization, which could negatively affect women's welfare given women's vulnerability in society (Berik 2000) . Furthermore, even if economic globalization decreases gender differences in labor markets, such a reduction may not necessarily indicate women's empowerment because it may be the case that gender gaps were narrowed due to the disproportional deterioration of (a previously high level of) male wages and working conditions (Berik 2000) . While disagreeing on the potential impact of economic integration, both arguments seem to unanimously conclude that additional efforts such as the promotion of female education and reduction of feminized poverty are required in order for economic integration to generate a positive impact on women's empowerment.
Building on such arguments, I predict that economic globalization itself is not a driving force in improving women's economic rights because the interests of global capital are not necessarily to empower women but rather likely to utilize their labor forces in order to maximize competition (Sen 2001; C Ertürk 2004) . In this paper, an inclusive term, women's economic rights, is used. Neither female wage nor employment reflects the overall economic empowerment of women as it is often the case that female employment increases due to low wages. Thus, I utilize a composite measurement of women's economic rights, that being access to economic resources -including women's pay, employment and entrepreneurship -in order to estimate the overall effect on women's economic status 4 .
Moreover, I expect that economic globalization will not improve women's social and political rights ensuring gender equality in private and public spheres. As mentioned above, a potential increase in female participation in economic activities is generated by capitalists' need for cheaper labor (Sen 2001) , which may not lead to an improvement in women's fundamental rights, especially if a women's role is merely seen as a provider of cheap labor or a supplement to male labor. This type of globalization may set women's role in the society as inferior to the male role and therefore women's rights beyond the scope of employment would not be improved. With this argument, I predict that economic globalization does not increase women's rights in the social, political, and institutional dimensions as these rights are not directly related to the interests or needs of the market.
H1. Economic globalization does not increase women's rights
Social Globalization and Women's Rights
A commonly accepted definition of globalization includes not only economic, but also political, cultural, social, and technological interactions across countries (Dreher 2006 Social globalization can therefore create change in the perceptions and attitudes towards women and thus the impact of social globalization on women's rights is arguably stronger than that of economic globalization. In particular, social globalization will have a positive impact on women's social rights, granting equality in family matters and selfgovernance because these rights directly reflect societal perceptions and attitudes towards women.
H2: Social globalization increases women's rights.
Globalization and Rights of Marginalized Foreign Women
One important question this paper contributes to the literature is whether globalization can be further beneficial to women without a legal standing in a country. Human rights protection is Given the fact that books are generally cultural goods, book trade proxies cultural exchanges, while newspaper trade stands for information exchanges.
Women's Rights
To measure women's rights, I make use of the composite index developed by Cingranelli and Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset (2008) . The CIRI index provides three indicators to represent women's economic, political, and social rights, respectively. The main advantage of using the CIRI index is that this data captures comprehensive dimensions of women's standing by law and in practice. Furthermore, the dataset the CIRI Index provides covers up to 190 countries for the last three decades enabling to ascertain global patterns in women's rights attainment 8 .
7 In this paper, I make use of each sub-dimension of the Social Globalization Index instead of employing the overall index in o rder to capture the specific aspects each dimension reflects, and also to avoid prob lems caused by aggregate measurements. 8 Although the CIRI Index is comprehensive, global indicators serving the purpose of my research, it is not free of limitations. One important limitation is that these indicators are aggregated ordinal point scales loosing detailed informat ion on complex factors of wo men's economic, political, social rights. As a result, it is difficult to see which components of each right are being realized and which are not being respected in law and practice towards the respective right -i.e. improvement in the wo men's economic rights indicator could be caused by many different factors such as equal payment, equality in hiring and promotion, etc. The same issue arises with the wo men's social rights indicator. A same score can be driven by many different co mbinations of wo men's social rights attainments and it is hard to tell which co mponents of wo men's social rights improved while others The women's economic rights index includes women's rights for equal pay for equal work, free choice of profession, the right to gainful employment, equality in hiring and promotion practice, job security, non-discrimination by employers, the right to be free from sexual harassment at workplaces, the right to work at night, the right to take dangerous work and the right to work in the military and the police force. The women's social rights index captures the right to equal inheritance and equal marriage, the right to travel abroad and obtain a passport, the right to confer citizenship to children or a husband, the right to initiate a divorce, the right to property brought into marriage, the right to participate in social activities, as well as education, the freedom to choose a residence, and freedom from female genital mutilation and forced sterilization. The women's political rights index represents the right to vote and run for political office, the right to hold government positions and join political parties, and the right to petition government officials.
2. 1. Human Trafficking
Human trafficking inflows into a country are a proxy for the respect for foreign women without a legal standing which exists in that said country. It is a good indicator for this purpose because human trafficking is an extreme form of abuse and violence against those vulnerable in society, the vast majority of victims being foreign women (UNODC 2006).
Therefore, this proxy indicates whether women's rights can be ensured regardless of citizenship and for those most marginalized in society.
As human trafficking is a clandestine, criminal activity, with those being trafficked and involved in such activities being part of 'hidden populations' (Tyldum and Brunovskis 2005) , reliable and comparable data reflecting the comprehensive magnitude of the problem is very difficult, if not impossible, to obtain (Kangaspunta 2003) . Among the currently available sources, the Incidence Reporting Index developed by the UNODC (2006) is arguably one of the most reliable and comprehensive indicators 9 . This index aggregates numbers of human trafficking incidences recoded by 113 major institutes worldwide during the data collection remain the same or even declined. In other word, with these uni-dimensional scales of the CIRI Index, we are unable to distinguish variations in the levels of respect for different types of wo men's rights. Additionally, the composition of the wo men's economic indicator focuses on women's rights in emp loyment and workplaces while neglect ing several other impo rtant economic rights such as subsistence rights (the rights to adequate food, clothing and housing) and other rights to ensure women's well-being, widely because of the lack of internationally comparable statistics. The author thanks an anonymous referee for pointing out these issues. 9 Given that human trafficking is associated with migration (Mah moud and Trebesch 2010), migrat ion data could be an alternative measurement. However, correlation between the UNODC hu man trafficking data and international migration rates (taken fro m the United Nations Population Fund 2008) is just 0.34. Th is low correlation is possibly driven by the fact that the existing migration data main ly reflect legal, documented migration, while human trafficking is more closely associated with illegal migration. On the other hand, this index is not free from drawbacks. First, the Index partially relies on self-reporting by countries because 27% of the informational sources come from governments. Using governmental sources may bias the measurement because of different levels of law enforcement and different data collection methods and definitions of human trafficking used across countries, making international comparison difficult 11 . However, the UNODC also utilizes various other informational sources: international organizations (32%), NGOs (18%), research institutes (18%), and media (5%). Given that, potential biases causes by self-reporting are arguably lower in the UNODC index, compared to other available official statistics (such as national crime statistics), which are completely dependent on selfreporting by governments. Furthermore, the data was coded from the aforementioned reports by the UNODC (not by individual governments) based on the international definition of human trafficking prescribed by the UN Anti-trafficking Protocol (2000), further mitigating problems in international comparison.
In addition to self-reporting, there are some other drawbacks of the Index. It aggregates information collected during the period and therefore time-variations of human trafficking are not captured. Moreover, given the geographical distribution of informational sources, the data collection can be subject to regional bias, namely an overestimation of 10 Some of the vict ims recoded in the Index are not females -boys (3%), men (2%), and children without mentioning the sex (24%). Therefore this index represents male trafficking as well to a certain degree, although they are a minority. 11 There is another concern that human trafficking may not be illegal in some countries and therefore human trafficking incidences in these countries may not be captured in the Index. However, the Anti-trafficking Policy Index (Cho at el. 2011) shows that to present, 148 countries wo rld wide have already adopted anti-trafficking law, indicating that the majority of the world have acknowledged the illegality of human trafficking in their national law. However, it is still possible that incidences -particularly those reported in govern mental sources -may not have thoroughly been collected in countries where national legislation against human trafficking is absent or the law is not enforced. Akee et al. (2010a Akee et al. ( , 2010b . This binary panel data with time variations supplements the UNODC Index with cross-sectional, but more detailed ordinal scores.
Estimation Strategies
For the analysis on women's rights, I estimate pooled time-series cross-section (panel data)
regressions. The panel data cover a maximum of 150 countries during the 1981-2008 period.
The basic equation to test the hypotheses is specified as:
Rights it 1 2 Rights it-1 3 Globalization it 4 Z it t + u it (1) where Rights it represents the measure of women's economic, social, and political rights (CIRI Index) respectively, for country i in year t. Globalization it is the main variable(s) of interest:
trade openness and FDI for economic globalization and information flows, personal contacts t time fixed effects and u it is the idiosyncratic error term. This model also includes the lagged dependent variable, Rights it-1 , as women's rights reflect culturally rooted practice and persist over time (Cho 2010) . Including a lagged dependent variable has another advantage, that being it fixes problems associated with autocorrelation and model dynamic effects of X variables on Y (Beck and Katz 1995) . The dependent variable has an ordinal structure ranging from 0 to 3 13 , therefore I estimate the model with ordered probit.
Consequently, country fixed effects cannot be controlled for due to the incidental parameter problem (Wooldridge 2002) . Instead, this model includes several time-invariant variables which reflect country characteristics and influence women's rights in that country.
In this regard, regional effects are controlled for because there are significant regional differences in regard to social institutions and practices dealing with women's rights 
Endogeneity Concern
This section addresses whether the main model -equation (1) -is subject to reverse feedback effects, i.e. improvements in women's rights are causes of global integration rather than outcomes. Arguably, greater women's rights might also lead to higher levels of globalization.
For example, the active participation of women in society may increase information and personal exchanges across countries because there will be a larger pool of internet users, travelers etc. Table 1 shows the results of the Granger causality tests which were conducted to address this issue. According to Granger (1969) The results indicate that globalization is essentially the cause of women's rights. For information flows (to women's economic rights) and personal contacts (to both economic and social rights), reverse effects running from women's rights to globalization are also detected.
In order to address the endogeneity of these two variables, an instrumental variable (IV) approach is employed. The estimation methods are a two-stage least square technique with two-way fixed effects (2SLS) and an instrumental variable ordered probit (oprobit IV). Given the ordinal structure of the dependent variables, the oprobit IV estimation is more efficient than 2SLS (Long 1997) , while 2SLS estimations have the advantages of controlling for unobserved individual heterogeneity. Thus, I employ both methods and compare the results.
Knowing that it is difficult to find a single instrument with a high explanatory power for globalization but no direct effect on women's rights, I combine the three variables which seem to be most relevant as the instruments. 
Having more McDonald's outlets in a country would not directly improve women's rights however. The other instrument is 'voting in line with G-7 countries in the UN General
Assembly on key issues', suggested by Dreher and Sturm (2012) 18 . The justification for the selection of this instrument is that countries sharing political similarities with the major powers are likely to exchange information and people with those countries which are also major senders of information and human flows, while this instrument is arguably not a direct determinant of women's rights. Table 3 shows the validity of the instruments in terms of relevance and exclusion criteria. First, instrument relevance determines whether the selected instrument has a strong explanatory power on the endogenous explanatory variable of interest. The Cragg-Donald's first-stage F-test (Cragg and Donald 1993; Stock et al. 2002 ) is used to test for the relevance.
This test reports the statistic used to test the null hypothesis, i.e. whether the parameter estimate for the instrument in the first stage regression is equal to zero. A Cragg-Donald's 16 Furthermore, when I regress wo men's rights on the restriction variable, the coefficients of the restrict ions turn to be insignificant. However, acknowledging that the restriction variab le can be a direct measurement of economic globalization, whose effect is being investigated in my paper, I run an additional IV estimat ion using the other instruments (UN voting and McDonald's outlets) only, o mitting the restriction variable, and the results do not alter the main findings. 17 The number of McDonald's outlets is part of cultural pro ximity, wh ich turns out to have no exp lanatory power for wo men's rights in the empirical testing (see Table 2 shows the results for women's rights by employing ordered probit estimations, based on more than 3,000 observations from 146 countries in the last 28 years. In the estimations, the model includes the independent variables of interest with different combinations. First, the model includes the economic globalization variables only and a social globalization variable is then subsequently added. Columns (5), (10) and (15) show the results including all three social globalization variables, as well as civil liberty, a transmission mechanism 20 .
Empirical Findings
Regarding women's economic rights, trade openness positively affects women's economic rights at conventional levels of significance without controlling for social globalization, while the effect of FDI is largely insignificant. However, the positive effect of 19 The Wald test is used to test whether the x variable, assumed to be endogenous, is really endogenous -i.e. H 0 being that the correlat ion parameter rho is statistically d ifferent to zero in IV regressions. (Wooldridge 2002) . The results show that one fails to reject the null hypothesis at conventional levels of significance in all of the specifications. 20 However, including all the three variables is not the best specification given the high correlation amongst them (between 0.60 and 0.72). The control variables behave mostly as expected. The lagged dependent variable has a high explanatory power and is significant at the 1% level in all the models, confirming the 21 To highlight the significant effects of social globalizat ion in a quantitative manner, I estimate the marginal effect (probability). The results in appendix 2 show that increasing personal contacts by one standard deviation increases the probability of achieving higher wo men's economic rights -score 2 and 3 -by 6% and 0.01% respectively, wh ile decreasing the probability to be at the bottom level of wo men 's economic rights, score 0 and 1, by 0.2% and 6.4% respectively. A one standard deviation increase in information flows increases the probability of having a higher level of wo men's social rights -score 2 and 3 -by 4.7% and 0.02% respectively, while decreasing the probability to be score 0 and 1 by 0.7% and 4.7%. It seems that the marginal effects of social globalizat ion are sizeable in determining either relatively high women's rights (score 2) or relatively low women's rights (score 1).
habituated and cultural nature of women's rights. While economic development -incomedoes not generate a significant effect, political development -democracy and/or civil libertypositively affects women's rights. It is quite probable that economic development is not a direct determinant of women's rights, but rather has an indirect effect via institutional development. Having a higher proportion of Muslims in a country decreases women's social and political rights but the effect is insignificant for economic rights. Finally, being a member of the developed countries' club, the OECD, is positively associated with women's rights, indicating that the OECD's mandate to increase women's empowerment is translated into a positive outcome.
As expected, civil liberty demonstrates a strong effect on women's rights. As shown in appendix 1, social globalization promotes civil liberty and it is then transferred into improving women's rights. It seems that civil liberty -standing for civil association and the freedom of expression -is a direct linkage to the enhancement of women's rights compared to other institutional development, given that democracy loses its statistical significance when both variables are included 22 . More interestingly, even after controlling for civil liberty, which can be a transmission mechanism from social globalization to women's rights, a social globalization indicator (information flows) still has significant, positive effects on women's economic and social rights. It implies that the effects of social globalization are stronger for women, going beyond the overall improvement in the civil liberty of all citizens, probably because women would mostly gain benefits from social changes rather than losing, compared to men who would experience a mixture of positive and negative effects from social globalization, potentially challenging the existing male-dominated social structures.
As presented in table 3, the reverse-causality effect is addressed by the instrumental variable approach (instrumenting the endogenous globalization variables as described in section 4.1). The results show that personal contacts increase women's economic rights and the effect is significant at the 5% level. However, the positive effects of information flows on women's economic rights and personal contacts on women's social rights are not confirmed.
Taking endogeneity into account, social globalization improves women's rights in two ways:
women's economic rights via personal contacts and social rights via information flows (the latter is not instrumented given the results of the Granger-causality tests).
Finally, table 4 shows the results for human trafficking, a proxy of respect for marginalized foreign women. The results suggest that personal contacts tend to increase human trafficking inflows into a country, while other indicators of globalization do not have any significant effect, except cultural proximity in column 6 23 . This result seems to support a positive linkage between human trafficking and migration, which apparently increases personto-person contacts among different nationalities, as suggested in the literature (Mahmoud and Trebesch 2010) . This result indicates that while social globalization is beneficial to domestic women's rights and status, it does not increase respect for foreign women without a legal standing in a country. In fact, globalization can even be detrimental to them as seen in the case of personal contacts. This argument can be supported with the finding that the level of women's rights in a country is unanimously insignificant to human trafficking inflows 24 . On the other hand, international exchanges of goods, services and capital turn out to be insignificant to human trafficking inflows.
In regards to control variables, higher controls on corruption reduce human trafficking inflows, while a higher level of income induces more human trafficking. The population size also increases human trafficking inflows, as expected. The results are consistent when employing different datasets on human trafficking flows as well as different estimation techniques, with the only exception being some minor changes in the significance levels of the control variables.
Robustness of Findings
To test for the robustness of the main findings, I employ several additional estimation Appendix 2 shows the marginal effects (probabilit ies) of personal contacts on human trafficking. Through an increase of one standard deviation in personal contact, the probability of a country having 'a mediu m level of flows', 'h igh flo ws' and 'very high flows' -i.e. score 3, 4 and 5 -increase by 25.5%, 15% and 2.1% respectively (although the effect for score 5 is not significant at conventional levels). At the same t ime, the probability of having low, very low or no (reported) flows -score 2, 1 and 0 -decrease by 15%, 19% and 8.5%. 24 When the model includes the wo men's economic rights variables in the estimation, instead of wo men's social rights, the result remains the same.
globalization on women's economic and social rights still hold, while the impact of economic globalization disappear controlling for personal contacts and information flows.
Second, I employ liner estimations to address unobserved individual heterogeneity which was not captured in the ordered probit estimations due to incidental parameter problems (Wooldridge 2002) . Following Neumayer and de Soysa (2007) Additionally, this analysis suggests that the beneficial effect of social globalization on local women's rights is not necessarily passed on to marginalized foreign women, which has been proxied by human trafficking inflows in this paper. As one can see, globalization does not reduce human trafficking inflows or the associated exploitation of women without a legal standing in a country, even increasing its incidence in some cases. It seems that the impact of globalization on women's rights is still limited, with its effects not yet having complete global penetration for cosmopolitan citizens. 
Oprobit IV
2SLS
(5)
Oprobit IV Note: Instruments are voting in line with G-7 countries in the UN General Assembly on key issues, the number of McDonald's outlets and restrictions to trade and capital flows. Instrumented endogenous variables are information flows (colu mns 1-4) and personal contacts (columns 5-12). Parentheses are robust standard errors. */***/*** indicates significance at 10/5/1% level. Table 4 . Human Trafficking, 1981 (cross-sectional) and 2000 -2008 , 150 countries Note: Parentheses are standard errors. The standard errors are clustered at the country level. */***/*** indicates significance at 10/5/1% level.
(1)
(8) Note: The table reports the marginal effects corresponding to tables 2 and 4. The row 'sample frequency' reports the observed frequency in the sample, while 'p robability at means' yields the probability for observing a given index value according to the estimated model.
